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Abstract: The United States is in the grip of a drug overdose epidemic, with drug overdoses now taking more lives
than suicides, motor vehicle accidents, gun shootings or homicides. We know from research that overdose death
rates from heroin and fentanyl surged far ahead of those from prescription opioids after 2010. In this paper, we
hypothesize that this change has resulted in a declining correlation between opioid prescription rates and overdose
drug deaths among the states since 2010. And we find that, while there were, generally, increasingly strong positive
correlations between opioid prescription rates and drug overdose deaths among the states between 2006 and 2010,
there have been vastly decreasing correlations ever since then. This pattern implies a possible need for state-level
policymakers to shift their focus, from curbing opioid prescription rates to ensuring access to addiction treatment
for individuals already facing addiction to opioids.
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Introduction
In 2017, Americans suffered 70,236 deaths through
drug overdoses (CDC 2019), considerably more deaths
than they did through any of the following: suicides
(nearly 45,000), motor vehicle accidents (40,100), gun
shootings (15,549), homicides (17,284) or suicides
(nearly 45,000) (Giaritelli 2018). This number was also
considerably greater than the 58,220 Americans who
died during the Vietnam War and more than four times
the number (16,689) who died from drug overdoses in
1999 (Lopez, 2019). It is not hyperbole to say that the
U.S. is in the grips of a drug epidemic. But it is also
not an overstatement to say that if state agencies are to
devise adequate measures to fight this epidemic, they
will need to understand its nature and causes. This
paper sheds some light on those causes.
If one marks, as some have (e.g., Okie 2010; Quinones
2015), the takeoff of the steep rise in death rates due
to drug overdoses as the early 1990s, then, clearly, a
major factor in the drug epidemic was the increased
medical use of opioids. Until just before the 1990s the
medical community had assumed that opioids were

highly addictive and to be avoided (Quinones 2015:
15ff). But this attitude changed and a new, relaxed one
was reinforced in part by the aggressive marketing of
Oxycontin by Purdue Pharmacy after 1995 (Lopez
2019; Okie 2010). A flood of evidence shows that this
marketing was a major cause of the initial increase in
drug deaths (Hadland et al. 2019).
Of course, the enormous increase in the number of
prescription opioids did not occur in a social vacuum.
Numerous scholars (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2017; Case
and Deaton, 2015a; Case and Deaton, 2015b; Stiglitz,
2015) have pointed to the despair that resulted from
job opportunities lost to technical innovation and
outsourcing as well as the declining marital fortunes
of many Americans (Cherlin, 2009; Kenschaft, Clark
and Ciambrone 2016) since the 1980s. This despair led
to an unusual potential for many to use and misuse
prescription opioids when they became easily available.
When the radically increased supply of prescription
drugs like Oxycontin met the radically increased
despair of many Americans, the drug epidemic took off
in earnest.
The number of drug overdose deaths was also
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considerably greater than the 58,220 Americans who
died during the Vietnam War and more than four times
the number (16,689) who died from drug overdoses
in 1999 (Lopez 2009). It is not hyperbole to say that
the U.S. is in the grips of a drug epidemic. But it is also
not an overstatement to say that if state agencies are to
devise adequate measures to fight this epidemic, they
will need to understand its nature and causes. This paper
sheds some light on those causes.
If one marks, as some have (e.g., Okie 2010; Quinones
2015), the takeoff of the steep rise in death rates due
to drug overdoses as the early 1990s, then, clearly, a
major factor in the drug epidemic was the increased
medical use of opioids. Until just before the 1990s, the
medical community had assumed that opioids were
highly addictive and to be avoided (Quinones 2015:
15ff). But this attitude changed and a new, relaxed
one was reinforced in part by the aggressive marketing
of Oxycontin by Purdue Pharmacy after 1995 (Lopez
2019; Okie 2010). A flood of evidence shows that this
marketing was a major cause of the initial increase in
drug deaths (Hadland et al. 2019).
Of course, the enormous increase in the number of
prescription opioids did not occur in a social vacuum.
Numerous scholars (e.g., Case and Deaton 2017; Case
and Deaton 2015a; Case and Deaton 2015b; Stiglitz
2015) have pointed to the despair that resulted from
job opportunities lost to technical innovation and
outsourcing as well as the declining marital fortunes
of many Americans (Cherlin 2009; Kenschaft, Clark
and Ciambrone 2016) since the 1980s. This despair led
to an unusual potential for many to use and misuse
prescription opioids when they became easily available.
When the radically increased supply of prescription
drugs like Oxycontin met the radically increased
despair of many Americans, the drug epidemic took off
in earnest.
This simple description of the causes of the great rise
in drug overdose deaths between, say, 1999 and 2010,
when the opioid death rate rose just under 300% and
the opioid drug sales rose by just over 300% (Lopez
2019) had at least a couple of policy implications. On
the demand side (or why folks were in the market for
opioids) there seems to be an implicit call for better social
supports: for more satisfying employment opportunities
and for family assistance. As far as we can tell, few states
seem to have included such policies explicitly as part of
their efforts to tackle the drug overdose crisis. On the
supply side, one might have expected greater efforts
to regulate the supply of prescription opioids and the
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predatory marketing. In this regard, by 2015, states have
had a better record, with 31 states adopting policies to
educate prescribers about prescription drug misuse, 22
to educate pharmacists, 26 establishing guidelines for
safe opioid prescribing, and 23 providing requirements
for prescriber use of prescription monitoring programs
by 2015 (Wickramatilake et al. 2017).
But the major causes of the phenomenal rise in drug
deaths since 2010 seem to have been quite different
from those of the pre-2010 period and this change
may have major implications for policy. Between 2010
and 2017, overdose death rates from natural and semisynthetic opioids such as Oxycontin increased only
modestly, going up by less than 15%, while deaths from
heroin increased four times, from 3,000 to 15,000, and
deaths from synthetic opioids (like fentanyl) increased
nine-fold, from 3,000 to 28,000 (Glickman and Weiner,
2019). The 43,000 deaths in 2017 due to heroin and
fentanyl-like opioids constituted about 57% of the drug
overdose deaths that year.
The reason why this change is significant for policy
makers is that, if prescription drugs are no longer a
major cause of the drug overdose epidemic, policies
aimed at curbing the supply of prescription opioids
may actually lead to increased deaths among the group
of people already at risk for overdoses. In the absence
of available prescription opioids, these people may feel
forced to substitute more dangerous, and illegal, drugs
(like heroin and fentanyl). Glickman and Weiner (2019),
for example, distinguish between policies that “focus
on reducing the demand for opioids—for example, by
improving access to medication-assisted treatment”
and policies that are aimed at “reducing the supply of
opioids—for example, by increased monitoring and
regulation of opioid prescribing.” They argue that, given
the drugs (heroin and fentanyl-like products) that seem
to be driving the drug overdose epidemic today, putting
more emphasis on the former policies makes sense.
However, this shift in focus assumes that prescription
opioids are no longer a major driver of the epidemic.
This is the issue we address in this paper. We examine
the correlation between the opioid prescription rate
and the drug overdose rate among the 50 states over the
period 2006 to 2017. Based on our reading of the recent
history of the drug overdose epidemic, we hypothesize
that the correlation between prescriptions and drug
deaths will have risen before about 2010 and may have
declined thereafter.
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less likely to lead to addiction. In doing so, they likely
engendered the decline in prescriptions depicted in the
figure. On the other hand, those already addicted to
opioids gained access to illegal opioids, like heroin and
fentanyl. Such illegal drugs, because of their potency,
were even more likely to lead to death (e.g., Economist
2017a; Economist 2017; Glickman and Weiner 2019).
(See Figure 1.)

Coming Apart: The Changing Relationship between Drug Overdose Deaths and Opioid Prescriptions in the United States

Methods

Data about opioid prescription rates, both at the
national and state levels, are from the Centers of Disease
Control (CDC) in 2018. These data are available from
2006 to 2017. They are based upon information drawn
from a sample of about 50,000 pharmacies every year,
information about prescriptions for buprenorphine,
codeine, fentanyl, hydrocodone, hydromorphone,
methadone, morphine, oxycodone, oxymorphone, Figure 1. National Opioid Prescription Rates per 100
propoxyphene, tapentadol, and tramadol. They do not Persons and Drug Overdose Death Rate per 100,000
include products used for colds or coughs.
Persons for the Years 2006-2017
Data about drug overdose deaths, again at national
and state levels, are from the Kaiser Family Foundation
(KFF) in 2019. For purposes of comparison with the
opioid prescription data, we use data from 2006 to 2017.
KFF (2018) in turn received the data from the National
Vital Statistics System.
Our initial analysis simply depicts the relationship
between the overall opioid prescription rate and the drug
overdose rate by year for the U. S. as a whole. However,
our key concern is with the relationship between the
two rates among the 50 states for each year between
2006 and 2017. We use the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) to calculate those correlations.
Finally, we examine whether there might be lag periods
that would improve the predictive capacity of opioid
But just because the opioid prescription rate and the
prescription rates for drug overdose deaths among the
drug overdose rate at the national level have come apart
states.
does not mean that the correlation no longer exists at
the state level. And it is at the state level that important
Results
drug policy is made. It is still possible, for instance, that
those states that have the highest opioid prescription
In Figure 1 we examine the relationship between
rates have the highest drug overdose rates and that the
opioid prescription rate per 100 and the drug overdose
prescription rates remain a major cause of variation in
rate per 100,000 for the U.S. between 2006 and 2017.
drug death rates. After all, there remains huge variation
This figure shows that between 2006 and 2010, the
in the prescription rates, with Alabama pharmacists
relationship was generally positive: as the prescription
(with a prescription rate of 107.3 per 100 persons) filling
rate increased so did the drug overdose rate. This result
almost three times more prescriptions per person than
is consistent with findings from many other sources (e.g.,
those in Hawaii (37 per 100) (CDC 2018).
Kolodney et al. 2019; Lopez 2019; Paulozzi et al. 2011;
There also remains huge variation in the drug
Volkow et al. 2014), most of which view prescription
overdose death rates by state. However, there has also
opioids as driving the overdose epidemic until at least
been considerable change in the rank ordering of states
2010.
in terms of drug overdose death rates between 2006
What Figure 1 also shows, though, is that soon after
and 2017. This change occurred more among states
2010 there was actually a negative relationship between
with the highest death rates than those with the lowest.
the opioid prescription rate and the drug overdose rate,
Table 1 shows the five states with the highest and the
at least at the national level. This “coming apart” has
five states with the lowest drug overdose death rates in
been seen to be associated with two new developments.
both 2006 and 2017. One notable feature of the Table 1 is
On the one hand, many states introduced policies, as
how little the composition of the states with the lowest
we mentioned above, to make opioid prescriptions
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rates changed over the 11-year period. This would be
especially true if North Dakota’s rate in 2006 had not
been unavailable in 2006. (Its rate, 4.8 per 100,000, was
the lowest in the country in 2007.) Another remarkable
feature of Table 1 is how relatively little the rates for
the states with the lowest rates increased between 2006
and 2017. Iowa’s rate of 11.5 drug deaths per 100,000,
for instance, did not change at all between 2006 and
2017. A third significant feature of this table is how
relatively much the rates for the states with the highest
rates increased during the period. West Virginia’s rate
of 20.4 per 100,000 in 2006 almost tripled to 57.8 per
100,000 in 2017. A fourth notable feature is how the
geographic concentration of the states with the highest
rates changed between 2006 and 2017. In 2006 three of
the five states (New Mexico, Utah and Nevada) lay west
of the Mississippi River. But by 2017, none did, and
the four with the highest rates (West Virginia, Ohio,
Kentucky and Pennsylvania) formed a contiguous
corridor of drug overdose deaths up the middle of the
region east of the Mississippi. Many observers (e.g.,
Economist 2017b; Botelho et al. 2017) believe the
eastward movement of the drug scourge has resulted
from the location of the two major heroin markets in
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the United States. One, lying east of the Mississippi,
predominantly receives a white heroin from Columbia.
White heroin is sufficiently like the crushed pain pills
that addicts grew used to during the first decade of
the century that it made the switch from those pills
to heroin a relatively easy one—and in turn made the
switch over to fentanyl an easy one as well. A brown
heroin market, pushed by Mexican suppliers, largely
prevailed in states west of the Mississippi and “probably
deterred many painkiller addicts from trying the drug
(i.e., heroin), and has kept synthetic opioids at bay”
(Economist 2017b). (See Table 1.)
In any case, the tremendous variation by state in both
opioid prescription rates and the drug death rates means
it was still possible that the two could have remained
highly correlated after 2010. In fact, however, the
correlation between prescription rates and drug death
rates for the 50 states declined greatly since 2010. Figure
2 shows that the correlation (Pearson’s r) plummeted
dramatically from a high of +.65 in 2010 to +.11 in 2017
and did so essentially monotonically. (See Figure 2.)
Moreover, Figure 3, which graphs the R-squared values
(multiplied by 100) for each of these correlations, depicts
the dramatic reduction in the amount of variance in the

Table 1. States with the Highest and Lowest Drug Overdose Deaths Rates in 2006 and 2017

5
drug death rates across states that can be predicted (or years under study. Even using the four-year lag, though,
explained) by opioid prescription rates: from 42% in it is clear that the amount of variance explained by the
2010 to 1% in 2017. (See Figure 3.)
opioid prescription rate has dropped substantially since
2010—from about 42.4% in 2010 to about 6.5% in 2017.
Figure 2. Correlations of Opioid Prescription Rates We do not have data at this point for 2018 or 2019, but we
and Drug Death Rates by State for the Years 2006think it is very likely that even with the lag the variance
2017
explained by the opioid prescription rate would hover
just above zero percent. (See Figure 4.)
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Figure 4. Percentage of Variance in Drug Death
Rate Explained by Opioid Prescription Rate 4 years
Earlier

Figure 3. Percentage of Variance in the Drug
Overdose Death Rate by State, Explained by the
Opioid Prescription for the Years 2006-2017

We note that by correlating the drug overdose death
rate with the opioid prescription rate in any given year
we have not necessarily captured the appropriate lag
period between the two variables. Further analysis
indicates that correlations were substantially increased
when a lag of anywhere between two to four years was
employed, but that the lag period that maximized the
correlation between the drug overdose rate and the
opioid prescription rate depended on the particular
year. Figure 4, however, captures the amount of variance
explained when a four-year lag was used—the lag that
maximized the correlation for the greatest number of the

CONCLUSION
The major contribution of this paper is the finding
that very little of the current variation in recent drug
overdose death rates among U. S. states can be attributed
to variation in states’ opioid prescription rates. This is a
marked change from the beginning of the decade when
more than 40% of that variation could be explained by
the prescription rates alone. This result might have been
expected, given the dramatic change in the kinds of the
drugs that are most implicated in opioid-related deaths
between 2010 and 2017—a change from prescription
opioids to illicit heroin and fentanyl-like drugs (e.g.,
Botelho et al. 2017; Glickman and Weiner 2019; Scholl
et al. 2019). But the decline in the variance explained
in state drug overdose rates by state opioid prescription
rates was not a necessary implication of the increase
in the significance of heroin and fentanyl. Despite a
general decline in the opioid prescription rate in the
U.S. since 2010, it was still possible that this rate could
be highly correlated with the drug death rate among the
states. But we find that it is not.
Care is needed when deriving policy implications from
any single empirical study. But we feel the suggestion
made by Glickman and Weiner (2019)—that at least some
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states may want to moderate policies that would curb
the supply of prescription opioids and upgrade efforts
to improve access to medication-assisted treatments—
makes sense for at least three reasons. First, the supply of
prescription opioids is not strongly associated any longer
with the drug overdose rate—the finding of this paper.
Second, curbing the supply of prescription opioids may
actually compel those addicted to prescription opioids-whether obtained legally or not—to turn to more
dangerous alternatives like heroin and fentanyl. Third,
the evidence that policies aimed at reducing the supply
of prescription opioids actually reduce drug deaths is at
best equivocal, and some of it suggests that such policies
have led to the substitution of heroin for prescription
opioids among those already addicted to those opioids
(e.g., Paulozzi et al. 2014; Alpert et al. 2018; Pitt et al.
2018).
We are not entirely comfortable with the part of
Glickman and Weiner’s argument that would have all
states disinvest in stemming the supply of prescription
opioids to their people. Especially in states, like
Nebraska, South Dakota and North Dakota, where drug
death rates remain low, reducing the supply of opioid
pain relievers that are not absolutely necessary should
reduce the number of people who develop new opioid
addictions. However, evidence from our analysis (and
that of others) makes us feel relatively confident that
greater investment in stemming this supply in states
where addiction rates are high would be misplaced.
Given that the number of people who already die from
drug use disorders is so high in states like Ohio, Kentucky,
West Virginia, Pennsylvania and rural New England, we
feel that policies aimed at the treatment and functional
recovery of addicts deserve additional support. Volkow
et al. (2014) write of three kinds of medication-assisted
therapies (MATs) for patients with opioid addictions:
methadone, buprenphine and naitraxone. They also
speak of the substantial underuse of all three of these
medications as of 2012, when a National Survey on
Drug Use and Health estimated that only about two of
every five Americans declaring an opioid dependency
received a MAT for his or her opioid addiction. It is
likely that such a survey underestimated the number of
people with addictions and therefore overestimated the
percentage that was receiving treatment.
One limitation of our study is the absence of any
controls for the relationship between opioid prescription
rates and drug overdose rates. Bivariate analyses can
be suggestive but cannot be considered definitive.
Unfortunately, data about some of the most plausible
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suppressor variables—such as the heroin and fentanyl
use rates by state—are simply unavailable at this point
in time. It may be that future drug use surveys will
give us some handle on plausible suppressor variables.
However, at this point such variables remain elusive.
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